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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [
ONE MAN, 3.312 VOTES:
A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
JOHN F. BANZHAF III
The significant standard for measuring . . .voting power, as
Mr. Banzhaf points out, is . . his [voting member's]
"'ability ***, by his vote, to affect the passage or defeat of a
measure .
In order to measure the mathematical voting power...
it would be necessary to have the opinions of experts based
upon computer analyses.'
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE WAKE of the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions
Congress is now seriously considering several proposals to abolish
the Electoral College and to replace it with one of a number of alterna-
tive plans. 2 The ensuing discussion of this issue has been heated, and
even the United States Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar
Association have taken public stands.3 Sentiment for some change in
t Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. B.S.E.E., Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, 1962; LL.B., Columbia University, 1965. Much of
the material in this article was originally presented by the author in testimony before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the United States Senate on
July 14, 1967.
1. Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 251-53, 229 N.E.2d 195,
198-99, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502, 507-09 (1967).
2. For the actual bills and an explanation of the proposed amendments see
pp. 317-22 infra.
One interesting application of the reapportionment decisions in this area was
a suit by the State of Delaware in the United States Supreme Court against all of
the other states. Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966). Although Delaware
recognized that the entire Electoral College system could be modified only by consti-
tutional amendment, it asked the Court to outlaw the unit-vote or "winner take all"
system of casting electoral votes by which all of a state's votes, by law, go to the
candidate receiving the greatest number of popular votes. It claimed that the effect
of that system was to disadvantage voters in the less populous states. The arguments
were based in part on the author's techniques. See Motion for Leave to File Com-
plaint, Complaint and Brief at 83-85, Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, apparently on procedural grounds.
This analysis supports Delaware's claim that its citizens have far less than
average voting power but for reasons other than those stated in the complaint and
brief. However it also shows that two remedies tentatively proposed - a propor-
tional or a district system - would only create new and even greater inequalities.
3. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, following a policy
referendum of its member organizations, Jan. 31 [1966] announced it favored
abolishing the electoral college and shifting to either a nationwide popular vote
or a district system of choosing Presidential electors. The final vote of the
Chamber members for approving the new policy position was 3,877 (91.5 percent)
in favor and 362 K8.5 percent) opposed.
1966 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 496.
A special Commission on Electoral College Reform of the American Bar
Association recommended in January 1967 that the President and Vice President be
elected as a team by a national popular vote and that the Electoral College be
abolished. The Commission terms the present system "archaic, undemocratic, complex,
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the present system is also running strong among politicians and the man-
in-the-street.4 Interestingly enough, however, the workings and effects
of the existing system are so poorly understood that many people are
actually taking positions on the issue which appear to be contrary to
their own interests.' Others appear to have recognized the effects of the
present system but lack both proof and a quantitative appreciation of the
magnitude of the problems.'
The critical point of departure for an evaluation of the current
method of presidential election or of any of the alternatives now under
consideration is a determination of the voting power of the individual
voter in the different states. This article has adopted, as a measure of
voting power, a technique7 which has been generally accepted by mathe-
maticians and political scientists and which is also beginning to gain
judicial approval.' In order to apply this measurement technique to
ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous" and said that a direct election would ensure
election of the popular winner, abolish the "anachronism and threat" of the runaway
elector, "minimize the effect of accident and fraud in controlling the outcome of an
entire election" and "put a premium on voter turnout and encourage increased political
activity throughout the country." Commission on Electoral College Reform, American
Bar Ass'n, Electing the President, 53 A.B.A.J. 219, 220 (1967). See also COMMITTEE
ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, BAR ASS'N OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, PROPOSED CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROVIDING FOR DIRECT ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE
PRESIDENT (1967).
4. The Gallup Poll May 18 reported a heavy majority of the American people
would like to do away with the electoral college and substitute a direct vote of
the people for President. A nationwide sampling of citizens was asked, "Would
you approve or disapprove of an amendment to the Constitution which would do
away with the electoral college and base the election of a President on the total
popular vote cast throughout the nation?" Results: approve, 63 percent; dis-
approve, 20 percent; no opinion, 17 percent.
Sen. Quentin N. Burdick (D N.D.) conducted a poll of all members of the
50 state legislatures and found 58.8 percent in favor of direct election of the
President and only 9.7 percent in favor of continuing the existing system. Another
21.2 percent favored a proportional method of casting state electoral votes, while
10.2 percent were in favor of a district system. Results of the Burdick poll showed
that in 44 states, direct election was favored by 50 percent or more of the legis-
lators responding. . . . Support for direct election was almost as strong among
legislators from small states as those from large states. . . . Burdick's conclusion
was that "the climate for the reform of the electoral college has never been more
favorable."
1966 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 496-97.
5. For example the National Grange, which represents principally the rural
interests from the less populous states, took a position in favor of the present system
and against the direct election because it felt that the former favored its members.
Statement of Harry L. Graham, in Hearings Before the Senate Subconmn. on Consti-
titional Amendments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 12, 1967). See also note 37 infra.
6. These include the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, and Alexander M. Bickel, Chancellor Kent Professor of Law
and Legal History at Yale Law School. See pp. 326-27 infra.
7. For other applications see Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts - Do
They Violate the "One Man., One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966) ; Banzhaf,
Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REV.
317 (1965).
8. See generally pp. 309-12 infra. Prior to testifying as an expert wit-
ness in a reapportionment case involving both weighted voting and multi-member
districts, the author talked with four of the leading scholars in the field of the mathe-
matical analysis of voting power. These are Samuel Krislov, Professor of Political
Science at the University of Minnesota, who analyzed weighted voting in New York
WINTER 1968]
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the question of the voting power of citizens in each state, the aid of the
Fairleigh Dickinson University computer system was enlisted.' The
title of the present article reflects the results of the computer analysis
in which it was determined that a voter in New York State has 3.312
times the voting power of a citizen in another part of the country.
The complete analysis clearly demonstrates that the current Electoral
College system falls short of even an approximation of equality in
voting power. Such a disparity in favor of the citizens of New York
and the other large states also repudiates the often voiced view that
the inequalities in the present system favor the residents of the less
populous states. Moreover, these existing inequalities in voting power
appear to be reflected in the allocation of campaign resources, the
selection of presidential candidates, and in the effectiveness of minority
groups and third parties.
It can also be shown by utilization of the same measurement tech-
nique that there would be even greater inequalities in voting power if
either of the two present proposals for modifying the indirect system
of election were adopted; i.e., if the President were to be elected under
either a proportional or district plan. The third proposal of direct
election presents a generically different approach which obviates the
inequalities inherent in an indirect election. This article will explain
the method for the measurement of voting power, analyze, with the
aid of a computer, the voting power of citizens in the different states
under the existing and proposed plans for electing the President, and
examine some of the ramifications and implications of this analysis.
City's Board of Estimate, see notes 15 & 19 infra; Irwin Mann of the Courant Institute
of Mathematics at New York University and the coauthor of three previous mathe-
matical analyses of the electoral college, see note 14 infra; William H. Riker, Chair-
man of the Department of Political Science at the University of Rochester, who has
analyzed voting power in several different situations, see notes 14 15 16 & 20 infra;
and Lloyd S. Shapley, Senior Research Mathematician at the RANb dorp., who is
coauthor of the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power and who worked with Mann
on three previous analyses of the Electoral College, see notes 14, 15, & 20 infra.
These scholars were kind enough to submit affidavits in support of the author's tech-
nique of analysis and testimony, each of which said in part:
There is a method for the measurement of voting power in various voting
situations which is recognized and generally accepted in the fields of mathematics
and political science. This method is reflected in articles by the authors cited
above and more specifically in the articles cited in footnotes 14-21 of Banzhaf's
article in the Yale Law Journal. ...
Given the mathematical model described above, I believe that the analysis
of voting power reported in Banzhaf's article in Yale Law Journal is, within
the limitations and conditions stated therein, a reasonable, consistent, and correct
analysis of the distribution of voting power among the citizen voters, and that
it is both consistent with and a reasonable extension of the generally recognized
techniques for the measurement of voting power.
Affidavits submitted in Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Misc. 2d 116,
266 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
9. The computer calculations upon which this article is based were performed
under the direction of the author by Professor Martin A. Jacobs, Department of
Mathematics, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, N.J., on the University's
G.E. 235 Time-Shared Computer System. However, see note 28 infra.
[VOL. 13: p. 303
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II. THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER
This technique for the measurement of voting power is based
on the simple and almost self-evident proposition that the purpose of
any voting system is to allow each voting member some chance, how-
ever small, to affect the decisions which must be made. It can be
demonstrated by resort to common experience that different methods of
voting can result in variations in the effectiveness of the vote of a
given individual. In some cases, for example the election of a club
president in which each member may cast one vote, each member has
the same chance to affect the outcome, and all members obviously
have equal voting power. In other situations, for example in a stock-
holders' meeting where members cast votes in proportion to their
stock holdings, the ability of the voting members to affect the outcome
is not equal and they do not have equal voting power.
Voting power is simply the ability to affect decisions through the
process of voting. It can be most easily measured by comparing the
opportunities each voter has to affect the outcome. If all voters have
an equal chance to affect the outcome in a given voting situation, we
say that they have equal voting power. However, if some voters have
a greater chance than others, we say that the voting powers are unequal.
In any voting situation it is possible to consider all of the possible
ways in which the different voters could vote; i.e., to imagine all possible
voting combinations. One then asks in how many of these voting
combinations can each voter affect the outcome by changing his vote.
Since, a priori, all voting combinations are equally likely and therefore
equally significant, the number of combinations in which each voter can
change the outcome by changing his vote serves as the measure of his
voting power. In other words, no one can say which voting combina-
tions will occur most often, or which combinations will predominate
as to the more important issues. The most a legislature or judge can
do in seeking to equalize voting power is to satisfy himself that the sys-
tem allows each voting member an opportunity to affect the outcome in
an equal number of equally likely voting combinations.
A person's voting power, then, is measured by the fraction of the
total number of possible voting combinations in which he can, by
changing his vote, alter the outcome of the group's decision. To be
more precise, the ratio of the voting power of voter X to the voting
power of voter Y is equal to the ratio of the number of possible voting
combinations in which X could alter the outcome by changing his vote
(assuming that no other voters change their votes) to the number of
possible voting combinations in which Y could alter the outcome by
WINTER 1968]
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changing his vote (also assuming no other voters change their votes).
This method of measuring voting power, which is described here only
in briefest form, has been discussed at greater length by the author
in prior studies which dealt primarily with the reapportionment
decisions.'0
It is important to recognize that this technique measures the voting
power of the individual which is inherent in the rules governing the
voting system and the distribution of population, and does not reflect
the actual ability that any given individual voter has in a particular
election to affect the outcome. The latter would depend to some extent
on factors which are not inherent in the system, such as the relative
power of the political parties in different geographical areas, and condi-
tions which may be peculiar to the voter himself (e.g., whether as a
sign of protest he decides to vote for a minority party candidate who
has no chance of winning). Thus, a critical distinction must be drawn
between inequalities in voting power which are built into the system
(e.g., the old county unit system in Georgia" or the distribution of
electoral votes in the Electoral College) and those which result either
from the free choice among citizens as to how they use their voting
power (e.g., the political impotence of a Republican in a solidly Demo-
cratic state) or from factors outside of the legal rules governing the
process (e.g., voter intimidation, weather, the televised prediction of
election results, etc.). Concededly, these and other external factors
may affect a citizen's ability to affect the outcome of an election,
and, therefore, the theoretical voting power of an individual may
not coincide with his actual ability to affect the outcome of any par-
ticular election. The voting power measured here is that inherent in
the system and necessarily represents an average of a voter's effective-
ness in a large number of equally likely voting situations. However,
it is only with respect to those inequalities which result from the
rules of a particular system of voting on which we may properly
focus attention in determining the basic "fairness" of the system itself. 2
10. See note 7 supra.
11. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
12. The inequalities which this article discloses actually result from two factors:
the electoral system and the unequal distribution of population among the states. But
the 1960 census figures are used for the purpose of illustration only and inequalities
will continue to exist as long as there are large and small states. In contrast to
population inequalities, such factors as the solid South, liberal and minority power in
the larger states, and rural domination of the House of Representatives are probably
too transitory to form the basis for a lasting "balance of power" solution to the problem
of electing the President.
This technique may also be used as an analytic tool to evaluate the effect of
other political factors on voting. See Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts -
Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1333-34
(1966).
[VOL. 13 : p. 303
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III. ACCEPTANCE OF THE MEASURING TECHNIQUE
No doubt some critics will object to this method for measuring
voting power, either because it is "too theoretical," or because it is
based on an examination of only a limited number of situations which
occur infrequently, or for some other reason. Considerations of space
do not permit anything like a complete justification.' 3 Moreover, once
it is agreed that voting power is a relevant criteria, a reasonable quanti-
tative definition of the term is required and objections to any one
measuring technique may be weighed only as such a technique may
prove to be more or less acceptable than some other reasonably precise
and workable definition. Nevertheless, some very persuasive evidence
for the validity of the technique described is the acceptance of the basic
principle by other disciplines and the recent judicial approval which
it has received.
The technique of measuring voting power by calculating the num-
ber of opportunities each voter has to affect the decision has been gen-
erally accepted in the fields of mathematics 4 and political science. 5
13. The briefest answer to the "too theoretical" argument is that voting power
is itself a theoretical quantity which can only be demonstrated by theoretical tech-
niques. See p. 323 infra. The results of any given election also reflect the workings of
such other factors as the candidates themselves and the issues and may even depend on
such things as the weather (which often affects voter turnout). Moreover the effects
which have been demonstrated have been suspected by a large number of serious
thinkers for some time and are in accord with empirical evidence. See pp. 323-28
infra.
It is true that this measure of voting power is based on a small number of
voting combinations - those where the balance can be shifted easily - but this is
because these are the ones which are critical and decisive. Many properties are
measured by selecting either the most decisive and critical point (the strength of a
rope is measured at its breaking point) or a number of selections which are considered
average or a reasonable sample; e.g., intelligence or aptitude tests, the Dow Jones
stock index, and the Cost of Living Index.
14. See, e.g., J. KEMENY, J. SNELL & G. THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION TO FINITE
MATHEMATICS 74, 108 (1957) ; Shapley, Solution of Compound Games, in ADVANCES
IN GAMES THEORY 267 (1964) ;Riker, A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index,
4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 120-31 (1959) ; Shapley, Simple Games: An Outline of the
Descriptive Theory, 7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 59 (1962) ; Shapley, A Value for N-Person
Games, 2 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STUDIES 307 (1953).
For reports of mathematical applications of this technique to a different
aspect of the Electoral College see Mann & Shapley, The A Priori Voting Strength
of the Electoral College, in GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 151 (M. Shubik ed. 1964) ; I. MANN & L. SHAPLEY, VALUES Or LARGE
GAMES VI: EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE EXACTLY (RAND Corp. Memo
RM-3158-PR, May 1962); I. MANN & L. SHAPLEY, VALUE OF LARGE GAMES IV:
EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE BY MONTE CARLO TECHNIQUES (RAND Corp.
Memo. RM-2651, Sept. 19, 1960). But see note 48 infra.
15. See, e.g., P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL
PARTY CONVENTIONS 174-75 (1960) ; G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1964);
G. SCHUBERT, QUANITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, ch. 4 (1959) ; W. Riker,
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game, Sept. 6-10, 1966 (paper delivered at the 1966
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) ; Krislov, Theoretical
Attempts at Predicting Judicial Behavior, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1966) ; Krislov,
Power and Coalition in a Nine-Man Body, 6 Am. BEHAVIORAL Sci. Apr. 1963, at 24;
Riker, Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power, 58 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 341 (1964) ;
WINTER 1968]
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Moreover, the technique has been specifically employed to analyze voting
power in Congress,' 6 stockholders' meetings, 17 the French Assembly,'8
New York City's Board of Estimate,'9 weighted voting situations in
general,20 including the New Jersey Senate21 and Nassau County, New
York,22 and in multi-member districts.23 In at least two cases courts
have ordered computer analyses of weighted voting plans before them
and have held the plans unconstitutional because of hidden inequalities
uncovered by the studies.24 Very recently, in Iannucci v. Board of
Supervisors,25 New York State's highest court, adopting some of the
author's arguments as articulated in an amicus curiae brief, ruled
against two weighted voting plans, and held that such plans must be
subjected to a mathematical-computer analysis. The court stated:
Although the small towns in a county would be separately repre-
sented on the board, each might actually be less able to affect the
passage of legislation than if the county were divided into districts
of equal population with equal representation on the board and
several of the smaller towns were joined together in a single dis-
trict. (See Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathe-
matical Analysis, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 317.) The significant stand-
ard for measuring a legislator's voting power, as Mr. Banzhaf
points out, is not the number or fraction of votes which he may
cast but, rather, his "ability * * *, by his vote, to affect the passage
or defeat of a measure." . . . And he goes on to demonstrate
that a weighted voting plan, while apparently distributing this
voting power in proportion to population, may actually operate to
deprive the smaller towns of what little voting power they possess,
to such an extent that some of them might be completely disen-
Schubert, The Power of Organized Minorities in a Small Group, 9 ADVANCED SCI. Q.
133 (1964) ; Shapley & Shubik, A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power
in a Committee System, 48 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 787 (1954).
16. Riker & Niemi, The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of
Representatives, 56 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 58 (1962) ; Shapley & Shubik, supra note 15,
at 787-90.
17. Shapley & Shubik, supra note 15, at 791.
18. Riker, supra note 14, at 122-31.
19. Krislov, The Power Index, Reapportionment and the Principle of One Man,
One Vote, 1965 MODERN USES OFs LAW & LoGIC 37, 40-43.
20. Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts - Do They Violate the "One
Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966); Banzhaf, Weighted Voting
Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 317 (1965) ; Krislov,
supra note 19; W. RIKER & L. SHAPLEY, WEIGHTED VOTING: A MATHEMATICAL
ANALYSIS FOR INSTRUMENTAL JUDGMENTS (RAND Corp. Memo. P-3318, 1966).
21. Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19
RUTGERS L. REv. 317, 335-38 (1965).
22. Id. at 338-40.
23. Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts - Do They Violate the "One
Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
24. Dobish v. Board of Supervisors, 53 Misc.2d 732, 279 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct.
1967) ; Morris v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Misc.2d 929, 273 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
25. 20 N.Y.2d 244, 229 N.E.2d 195, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1967).
[VOL. 13 : p. 303
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franchised and rendered incapable of affecting any legislative de-
terminations at all ...
Unfortunately, it is not readily apparent on its face whether
either of the plans before us meets the constitutional standard. Nor
will practical experience in the use of such plans furnish relevant
data since the sole criterion is the mathematical voting power
which each legislator possesses in theory - i.e., the indicia of
representation - and not the actual voting power he possesses in
fact - i.e., the indicia of influence. In order to measure the mathe-
matical voting power of each member of these county boards of
supervisors and compare it with the proportion of the population
which he represents, it would be necessary to have the opinions
of experts based on computer analyses. The plans, then, are of
doubtful constitutional validity and to establish the facts one way
or another would be, in all likelihood, most expensive. In our
view, it was incumbent upon the boards to come forward with the
requisite proof that the plans were not defective.
[A] considered judgment [of the plans] is impossible
without computer analyses and, accordingly ... there is no alter-
native but to require them [the boards] to come forward with
such analyses and demonstrate the validity of their reapportion-
ment plans.26
This decision is of particular interest for several reasons. First,
it is particularly persuasive because it comes from one of the most
highly regarded state courts in the country. It is all the more per-
suasive because of the experience that this court has gained in this
specialized area because for a variety of reasons New York courts have
dealt with a large number of weighted voting cases. Secondly, the de-
cision is particularly important because it expressly recognizes the
validity of mathematical analysis in this area and specifically holds that
it may be the determining factor regardless of other empirical evidence.
Finally the decision is of greatest interest here because it validates this
technique of measurement by equating it with the legal meaning of
26. Id. at 251, 252-53, 254, 229 N.E.2d at 198, 199, 200, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 507,
508-09, 510. For other courts citing the author's work see, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Hill,
386 U.S. 120, 125 (1966); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953, 959-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Levet, J. dissenting) ; Graham v. Board of Supervisors, 18 N.Y.2d
672, 219 N.E.2d 870, 273 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1966) ; Dobish v. Board of Supervisors, 53
Misc.2d 732, 279 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Davis v. Board of Supervisors, 51
Misc.2d 347, 273 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 28 App. Div. 583, 279 N.Y.S.2d 434
(1967) ; Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Misc.2d 116, 266 N.Y.S.2d
998 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Barzelay & Carocci v. Board of Supervisors, 47 Misc.2d 1013,
263 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
WINTER 1968]
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voting power. It is not unlikely that other courts will now follow the
lead and likewise adopt this same technique - a technique which has
been noted with interest by the United States Supreme Court.
IV. ANALYSIS
The following study analyzes, in accordance with the measurement
principles which have already been discussed, the voting power of citi-
zens under the current electoral system and under the three proposed
plans for the election of the President now being considered by Con-
gress. The general method utilized in each case is to determine the
ability of a citizen in one state to affect the outcome of an election
and to compare this with the like ability of a citizen of another state
in the same election. The calculations actually employ census figures
rather than the number of voters because electoral votes are allocated
on that basis.
A. The Existing Electoral College
The analysis of the existing Electoral College is a two step process.
First, all of the different possible arrangements of electoral votes are
examined with the aid of a computer, and a determination is made of
those arrangements in which any given state, by a change in the way
it casts its bloc of electoral votes, could change the outcome of the
election. 2' As the second step one looks to the people of the state,
and determines in how many of the different voting combinations in-
volving people of that state any given resident could affect, by changing
his vote, how that state's bloc of electoral votes would be cast. Finally,
27. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 125 (1966).
28. The calculations for the first step of the analysis of the present Electoral
College were actually done in two slightly different ways, using two essentially similar
techniques. The first was performed by Lloyd S. Shapley of the Rand Corp. and
Irwin Mann, who is now connected with the Courant Institute of Mathematics in
New York City (both of whom also assisted the author in formulating the material
in this paper). They used an IBM 7094 computer and a specially developed program
which used the so-called Shapley-Shubik index of voting power. I. MANN & L.
SHAPLEY, VALUES Op LARGE GAMES VI: EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
EXACTLY (RAND Corp. Memo. RM-3158, 1962). Similar calculations were also
made by the IBM New York Scientific Center with the cooperation of Mr. Robert
G. Loomis and Mr. Lee Papayanopoulos on an IBM System/360 Model 50 computer
using a program specially developed to use the measurement technique suggested by
the author in Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19
RUTGERS L. REv. 317 (1965). See R. Shareshian, An Algorithm for Obtaining the
Frequency Distribution of a Linear Function of n 0-1 Variables; An Application to
Weighted Voting (unpublished).
The differences between the two techniques is explained in Banzhaf, Multi-
Member Electoral Districts - Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle,
75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1318n.21 (1966). However, as predicted by W. RiKER & L.
SHAPLEY, WEIGHTED VOTING: A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR INSTRUMENTAL
JUDGMENTS 9n.2 (RAND Corp. P-3318, 1966), and by Mann, in personal con-
versation with the author, the two techniques yield substantially similar results for
large numbers of voting units. Indeed, the differences between these two sets of
calculations were at most a few percent. Table I of the Appendix is based on the
figures from Mann and Shapley.
[VOL. 13 : p. 303
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the results of the two steps are combined and the result represents
the chance that any voter has of affecting the election of the President
through the medium of his state's electoral votes; in other words, his
chance to effectively participate in the presidential election. Although
the chance that any given voter will cast a decisive vote in the presi-
dential election is extremely small, the relative ability of each voter to
cast such a vote serves as a meaningful measure - and perhaps the only
possible measure - of his potential voting power.
The results of an analysis of the present Electoral College are
shown in Table I of the Appendix. The first column contains the
name of the state (or the District of Columbia), the second its popula-
tion according to the 1960 census, and the third the number of its
electoral votes. The fourth column shows the relative voting powers of
the citizens of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The figures
have been normalized or adjusted so that the figure for citizens with
the least voting power is set equal to one, and all others are numbers
greater than one. The table shows, for example, that a citizen of
New York has 3.312 times the voting power of a citizen of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Looking at the same figure from another point of
view, a resident of the District of Columbia has less than one-third
the chance that a citizen of New York has of casting a decisive vote
in the presidential election. The fifth column shows the extent of these
inequalities; the percentage by which the votes of the citizens of other
states are more effective than the votes of the most deprived voters.
Finally, the sixth column shows the percentage deviation from the
average, an average obtained by adding the effective voting powers in
the fourth column and dividing by fifty-one.
29
The general effect of the existing system is easily seen from the
table. Citizens of the small and medium-sized states are severely de-
prived of voting power in comparison with the residents of the few
very populous states who have far more voting power than the
others. The present Electoral College system, in conjunction with
state imposed unit-vote ("winner take all") laws, in effect in all of the
states, 0 greatly favors the citizens of the most populous states and
deprives citizens of the less populous states of an equal chance to affect
the election of the President.
29. An equally "valid" average might be obtained by multiplying the voting power
by the number of voters in each state and dividing by the total number of voters. This
would be a per voter average rather than the per state average which has been used
in these tables. See Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts - Do They Violate
the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1330n.41 (1966).
30. See, e.g., CAL. ELC'rIONS CODS §§ 10204-05 (West, 1961); N.Y. ELtC'rION
LAw 290 (McKinney 1964); OHIO Rtv. CODZ ANN. § 3505.10 (Page 1960); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3056(f) (1963); VA. COD ANN. §§ 24-290.4-.6 (1964).
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The reason for the deprivation is not so easily perceived. It arises
from the fact that the influence of a citizen-voter vis-A-vis his state's
electoral votes does not vary as the simple inverse of (one divided
by) the population of the state. In other words, the ability of a voter
to affect the way his state's bloc of electoral votes will be cast is not
halved if the population is doubled nor divided by three if the population
is tripled. Rather, an examination of all of the possible voting combina-
tions reveals that the chance of a voter to affect the way his state's
electoral votes will be cast decreases as the inverse of (one divided by)
the square root of the population. Thus, by forcing the citizens of each
state to vote as a bloc, the system increases the voting power of the
residents of the larger states.
This effect may be illustrated by a simplified example. Consider
the election of a congressman from a single electoral district. Every
voter has 1 vote and, therefore, has equal voting power in this election.
Suppose, however, that 3 voters, A, B, and C, were for some reason
required to vote as a group and that a bloc of 3 votes would be cast
in accordance with the majority vote of A, B, and C. There are 8 dif-
ferent voting combinations in which A, B, and C may cast their votes."'
In 4 of these A can alter the way in which the bloc of 3 votes will be
cast by changing his own vote. The situation is the same for B and for
C; each can change the outcome in half of the total number of com-
binations. Thus, each of the three can, by changing his own vote, affect
the way in which the bloc of 3 votes will be cast in 50% of the cases. 2
31. A may vote in either of 2 ways. In each of these 2 cases B could also vote
in either of 2 ways. Finally, in each of these 4 cases, C could vote in either of 2 ways
for a total of 8. In general, a body of N persons able to vote for either of two can-
didates has 2N possible voting combinations. This example reflects the usual case
where the voters have a choice between two major candidates.
32. The table below shows the 8 possible voting combinations. It also shows the
combinations in which each voter can cast a critical vote. It should be noted that
often more than one voter can cast a critical vote in the same combination in the sense
that a change by either would affect the outcome.
Possible Voting Winning Voter Casts a
Combinations Candidate Critical Vote
A B C A B C
Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y X Y C C
3 Y X Y Y C C
4 Y X X X C C
5 X Y Y Y C C
6 X Y X X C C
7 X X Y X C C
8 X X X X
Y = a vote for candidate Y Y = Y wins C means that aX = a vote for candidate X X = X wine particular voter can
change the outcome
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In contrast, any single elector in the district has 100%o control over how
his smaller "bloc" of 1 vote should be cast. Since the bloc of 3 votes
is three times as effective from the point of view of affecting the election
as any single vote, and since A can affect the way in which the bloc of
3 votes will be cast in 50% of the cases, A has more voting power
than other voters who have only 100% control over 1 vote; i.e., 50%o
of 3 votes is greater than 100%o of 1 vote. The voting power of A, B,
and C has been increased by requiring them to cast their votes as a bloc.
Bloc or unit-voting can, therefore, be identified as the crucial factor
resulting in the disparities in voting power under the present system.
This example may be extended to further demonstrate the effect.
Suppose that 5 voters in the same electoral district, P, Q, R, S, and T,
were required to vote as a group and their group vote determined how
the bloc of 5 votes would be cast. There are 32 possible voting combina-
tions, and P can affect the outcome in 12 of these. P thus has a 1%2
chance of affecting 5 votes which gives him more than 1.8 times the
voting power of the ordinary voter who has 100% control over only
1 vote; i.e., 1%2 of 5 is 1.8, which is greater than 100% of 1. By
extending this process it can be shown that the voting power of an
individual voter increases as the size of his voting group increases33 and
33. In a group of N voters, there are 2N different voting combinations. For an
individual voter to be able to cast a critical vote, the other voters in the group must
be equally divided. The formula for the number of combinations which can be formed
by M persons divided into two equal groups is:
Mt
The exclamation point (!) indicates a factorial. It means that the number it follows is
to be multiplied by every positive integer smaller than itself (e.g., 41 = 4.3.2.1 = 24).
In calculating the number of times each person can cast a critical vote, the fraction
must be multiplied by 2 to account for votes for the two different candidates. Calcula-
tions for four different sized voting groups are presented below.
No. in
Group
and Possible Number of Times
No. of Combi- Each Casts Percent Effective Voting
Votes nations Critical Vote Influence Power
2!
23 8 2 X - 4 4/8 = 50% 50% of 3 = 1.5
(1i).• (1 !)
41
5 25 = 32 2 X - 12 12/32 = 37.5% 37.5% of 5 = 1.88
(2!) • (2!)
6!
7 27 = 128 2 X 40 40/128 = 31.2% 31.2% of 7 = 2.18
(3!) • (3!)
81
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that for numbers of reasonable size the voting power is proportional
to the square root of the group's population (where the group controls
a number of votes proportional to its number of members). There may
also be voting situations in which different numbers of people are re-
quired to vote as a unit but where each voting unit may not have a
number of votes proportional to its population. In such a case, the
ability of any member of the group to affect the group's decision (or
how it will cast its votes) will nevertheless decrease in the fashion which
has been previously indicated, which for numbers of reasonable size
is as the inverse of the square root of the population."4 Thus, by com-
bining these two principles, it can be shown that the voting power of
any member of a reasonably sized voting group will be proportional
to the voting power of the group (which is roughly proportional to the
number of votes it can cast) and inversely proportional to the square
root of its population.
34. Consider a group made up of N + 1 citizen-voters, where N is an even num-
ber. The total number of ways in which each citizen-voter could vote for either of two
principal candidates is 2N+I which is equal to 2. 2N. Each would be able to cast a
critical vote only where the other N citizen-voters were equally divided into two
N N
groups; - voting yea and - voting nay. This, as previously indicated, can happen
2 2
2.N!
in ways. Thus, an individual citizen-voter would be critical
([ ]1 .([3 N,
in determining the outcome of a vote in the following fraction of combinations.
2.N! N!
(2*2N) =2[ 2') ( 1 2[ 2'.
The factorial of large numbers may be very closely approximated by the following
formula which is known as Stirling's formula:
ml ! e-m mm /V/rm
where e and ir are well known mathematical constants. Substituting this value into the
N
previous formula by allowing - to equal m, the fraction becomes:
2
e- 2 m (2m) 2 m V41rm
22m * e-m * mm V/2rm e-m * mm • /2rm
By expanding the numerator into separate multiplicative terms and cancelling common
terms in the numerator and denominator, the result is that the individual citizen-voter
1
is critical in - combinations.
12rN
Where m is greater than 100, Stirling's formula gives a result which is accurate to
within 0.1% and becomes more accurate as m increases. I. SOKOLNIKOFF & R.
REDHEFFER, MATHEMATICS OF PHYSICS AND MODERN ENGINEERING 644-45 (1958).
Riker and Shapley have reported that voting power also varies as the inverse of the
square root of population under the Shapley-Shubik index. W. RIKER & L. SHALZv,
[VOL. 13 : p. 303
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As an example of the operation of these principles in their appli-
cation to the Electoral College, consider the states of New York and
Alaska. New York has approximately seventy-four times the popula-
tion of Alaska. One might suppose that a citizen of New York would
have one-seventy-fourth the chance of affecting New York's 43 electoral
votes as a voter in Alaska would have of affecting Alaska's 3 votes.
However, as has been shown, the relative effectiveness of the two voters
depends instead on the ratio of the square roots of the populations, and,
therefore, a New Yorker has about one-ninth as much chance of af-
fecting his state's electoral votes as a voter in Alaska has of affecting
his. But, because a New Yorker may potentially affect 43 votes as
compared with the Alaskan's potential effect on only 3 votes, the New
Yorker's decrease in effectiveness with respect to his state's electoral
votes is far outweighed by the vastly larger number of electoral votes
he may potentially affect. Actually, a New Yorker has almost twice the
potential for affecting the overall election as does an Alaskan voting on
the same day in the same election (3.312 compared with 1.838).
This comparative analysis has been performed identically for all
of the other states. The most favored citizens under the present Elec-
toral College are those of New York, California, Pennsylvania, and
Ohio; the most deprived are those in Maine, New Mexico, Nebraska,
Utah, and the District of Columbia. Citizens in 32 states (and the Dis-
trict of Columbia), only two fewer than are needed to propose a
constitutional amendment, have less than average voting power."
Citizens of all other states are at a disadvantage in comparison with
the voting power of citizens of the most favored state, New York.
It should be noted that the plan and suggested amendment pro-
posed by President Johnson 6 would in no way correct the inequalities
which have been demonstrated. Under the plan, the actual electors
would be abolished but the states would retain the electoral votes they
now have. All of the electoral votes of each state would be cast for the
candidate receiving the greatest number of votes in that state. Since
this plan constitutes only a formal change, leaving the substance of the
WEIGHTED VOTING: A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR INSTRUMENTAL JUDGMENTS
(RAND Corp. Memo. P-3318, 1966).
35. The author has often been asked, by people who believe that the average
always falls somewhere in the middle, how more than half the states can be below
average. The answer is that it will always happen when the distribution of figures is
not uniform (i.e., is "uneven") and the higher figures are, in non-mathematical lan-
guage, "far out of line." Consider a school class of 20 children each 5 years old taught
by two 27 year old teachers. The average age of all of the people in the room is
7: 20x5 + 2x27 = 154; 154/22 = 7. In this example all of the 20 children are
below the average age. The example would not be substantially changed if the
children's ages ranged from 4 to 7 years.
36. See President Johnson's message to Congress on January 20, 1966, reported
in 1966 CONG. Q. 1248. Now S.J. Res. 21, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced
by Senator McGee of Wyoming).
WINTER 1968]
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current indirect method unaltered, the voters in the larger states would
still be able to exert an inordinate amount of influence by affecting their
state's large bloc of electoral votes, and the result would be that the
voters in the small and middle-sized states would still have far less than
equal voting power.
President Johnson's proposal, however, would have one important
effect. It would freeze the present inequalities and put them beyond the
reach of the legislatures of the several states and the federal courts.
Under the present system, the inequalities exist because of the unit-
vote ("winner take all") laws which are in force in the states. These
laws are still susceptible to change by act of the legislatures - possibly
with the encouragement of some form of interstate compact - or by the
courts. If the inequalities were locked in by constitutional amendment,
subsequent correction would require the joint efforts of Congress and
the legislatures of three-fourths of the states.
B. Proportional Plans
Under the so-called proportional plans37 for election of the Presi-
dent, the states would retain their present number of electoral votes.
However, instead of awarding all of the votes in a state to the candi-
date receiving the greatest statewide vote - as is now the case in all
fifty states - the state's electoral vote would be divided in proportion
to the statewide popular vote for the candidates. Thus if a state had 3
electoral votes and 60% of the people voted for candidate X, candidate
X would receive 60% of 3 votes or 1.8 electoral votes.
The effects of such plans may be more easily seen by considering
the mathematical equivalent of this system. Significantly, under this
method, every time a citizen casts his vote he directly causes a shift of a
small portion of the state's electoral vote. This small fraction is equal
to the total number of the state's electoral votes divided by the total
number of voters in the state. Thus, in a hypothetical state with 1,000,-
000 voters and 4 electoral votes, each citizen's vote in the election
would, in effect, shift 4/1,000,000 or .000004 electoral votes in the
modified Electoral College. Thus, each citizen-voter would actually
cast a vote in a pseudo-electoral college, a vote which constitutes a small
fraction of a single electoral vote.
37. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 84, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Senator
Sparkman of Alabama and others) ; S.J. Res. 7, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (intro-
duced by Senator Holland of Florida) ; S.J. Res. 3, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
(introduced by Senator Smathers of Florida).
It is interesting to note that if this type of plan is adopted the citizens of
these states will suffer significant deprivations of voting power both with respect to
a direct election and with respect to the present system.
[VOL. 13 : p. 303
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There would be no inequalities under a proportional system if
the vote of each citizen-voter in the United States shifted the same
fractional vote in the pseudo-electoral college. In other words, all citi-
zens would have equal voting power if the fractional votes effectively
cast by each citizen in the pseudo-electoral college were equal. Such
would be the case, for example, if the electoral votes were distributed
in direct proportion to the population of the states. In fact, however,
this is far from true.
Every state is now entitled to two electors as well as an additional
number of electors based on the state's population. Moreover, each state
is entitled to at least one elector in addition to the original two whether
or not its population is equal to that of an average congressional dis-
trict. Thus, no matter how small the population, each state has at least
three electoral votes. It is also well known that smaller states have far
more electoral votes per resident than the more populous states. 8
Under the proportional system, voters in each state would not be
forced to vote by groups and, as a result, groups would not have the
power to shift large blocs of votes by majority control. Thus, the ad-
vantage the citizens of the larger states enjoy under the present system
would disappear, and the greater number of electoral votes per unit of
population would give an advantage to the citizens in the less populous
states. Each voter, in effect, would cast a fractional vote in the Electoral
College, and this vote would be equal to the number of the state's elec-
toral votes divided by the state's population. Simple division demon-
strates that the residents of the smaller states would have a far greater
chance to affect the election of the President through their greater frac-
tional votes than residents of the large and middle-sized states because,
under these circumstances, voting power is directly proportional to the
fractional vote each voter effectively casts. Table II of the Appendix
indicates this result on a state by state basis.
Under the proportional system the most favored citizens would be
those in Alaska whose votes would be worth more than five times as
much as votes cast in California or New York. Moreover, 171,049,740
citizens in 36 states and the District of Columbia would have less than
average voting power under the proportional plan. This is over 95% of
the total population!
38. For this reason it was widely believed that the existing Electoral College
favored the citizens of the smaller states. But this is not the case. Although the
smaller states have more electoral votes per resident, this does not give them a net
advantage under the existing system because the unit-vote rule requires voters in
each state to vote as a group. As previously explained, where voters vote as groups,
the large groups, whose majorities control large blocs of electoral votes, have a
significant voting advantage which far outweighs the advantage which the smaller
states thought they had obtained from the unequal distribution of electoral votes.
WINTER 1968]
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Under the proposed district plans for the election of the President,
the citizens of each state would elect two electors at large and one from
each congressional district, or at least the electoral votes would be
cast as though electors had actually been so chosen .3  Thus, although
residents would still vote in units - electoral districts - in which
the majority vote of the group would determine how that unit's vote
would be cast, the voting units for the most part would be smaller and
more nearly uniform than under the present system. Moreover, in con-
trast to the present electoral system, no voting unit would be capable
of controlling a large bloc of electoral votes. For these reasons, resi-
dents of the larger states would not receive the voting power advantage
they enjoy under the existing system.
A twofold similarity exists between the district plan and the pro-
portional plan: each state would be entitled to at least three electors or
electoral votes regardless of its population, and the smaller states would
still have a far greater number of electors or electoral votes per unit
of population than the more populous states. Under the proportional
system, as previously indicated, the voting power of each citizen is
directly proportional to the fractional electoral vote that he, in effect,
controls; i.e., proportional to the number of electoral votes of his state
divided by the state's population. Here the practical effect would be
almost the same although the mechanism is neither so direct nor so
simple.
To calculate a citizen's voting power under the district system, one
first calculates the chance that each citizen-voter would have to affect
the election through his effect on the two at-large electoral votes.
This figure, as previously demonstrated, is inversely proportional to the
square root of the state's population. To this figure one then adds
the chance that the voter would have to affect the election through his
effect upon the electoral vote corresponding to the congressional dis-
trict in which he resides. This is inversely proportional to the square
root of the district's population. The resultant sum represents the
chance each voter would have of affecting the outcome of the presiden-
tial election - his voting power.
39. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 86, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Senator
Gruening of Alaska) (providing for electors bound to previously announced can-
didates) ; S.J. Res. 55, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Senator Cotton of
New Hampshire) (providing for bound electors) ; S.J. Res. 25, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) (introduced by Senator Scott of Pennsylvania) (providing for electoral votes
to be cast by the states in accordance with the greatest number of votes in each voting
unit) ; S.J. Res. 12, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) (introduced by Senator Mundt of
South Dakota and others) (providing for bound electors).
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The results of the analysis of the district plan are shown in Table
III of the Appendix. Similar to the proportional system, the voter
in the small state would have a disproportionate advantage in voting
power because the smaller states would have more electoral votes per
unit of population. In making these calculations the simplifying assump-
tion was made that within each state the population of each electoral
district was equal to the state's population divided by the number of dis-
tricts. Even with this assumption, which tends to underestimate the
disparities, the inequalities in voting power are very significant. The
voter in the small state is again favored at the expense of voters in the
large and middle-sized states. Under the district plan the most favored
voters would be those in Alaska, Nevada, and Wyoming, who would
have more than two and one-half times the voting power of citizens
in New York and California. Moreover, 168,014,360 citizens in 34
states would have less than average voting power under the district
system. This is over 93% of the total population !4
If past and present conditions are any guide, it is not realistic to
assume that districts will be even of approximately equal size. Varia-
tions of 20% and more are not uncommon and in the past variations
have been far more considerable. 41 To the extent that there are varia-
tions in district population within a given state, the inequalities shown
in the table would be increased. Although its effects are beyond the
scope of this analysis, it is fair to point out that the district system
also offers both the opportunity and motive for gerrymandering with
respect to the presidential election - something which is not true of
any other system.
D. Direct Presidential Election
There are also several proposals for election of the President by
a direct vote of the people. 2 The winner would be the candidate for
whom the greatest number of people voted, either initially or in a run-
off election. Since no distinction whatever is made between votes cast
40. See note 35 supra.
41. In early 1964 the United States Supreme Court, holding that congressional
districts within a state must be of substantially equal population, struck down the
apportionment plan in Georgia which included variations of three to one. Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The variations in congressional districts in other
states at that time were shown in an Appendix to the Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting. 376 U.S. at 49. More than three years after that decision, it is now
estimated that congressional districts in 33 states still have variations of more than
10%. See U.S. CODt CONG. & AD. NEws, July 20, 1967, at iv.
42. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 15, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Senator
Burdick of North Dakota) ; S.J. Res. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by
Senator Smith of Maine and others); S.J. Res. 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
(introduced by Senator Bayh of Indiana on behalf of himself and 19 other senators).
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by residents of different states or congressional districts, it is obvious
that all voters would have an equal chance of affecting the outcome
of the election and, therefore, would have equal voting power. For ease
of comparison with the other plans, these equalities are shown in Table
IV of the Appendix. Of all systems, both present and proposed, the
direct election is the only plan which guarantees to each citizen the
chance to participate equally in the election of the President.
Although the pragmatic effect of the direct election in equalizing
voting power is clear, it is also well to note that several structural prob-
lems are also avoided by this method. First, because no citizen is arbi-
trarily required to vote as a member of a group (state or district),
there are no inequalities in voting power caused by bloc-voting or unit-
voting nor is there any possibility of inequalities caused by gerry-
mandering. Secondly, because electoral votes are abolished, there are
no inequalities introduced because of an inequitable distribution of
electoral votes, nor could any be introduced by a reassignment of elec-
toral votes caused by population changes. Thirdly, the so-called phe-
nomena of "wasted votes" is eliminated because each vote is counted
directly in determining the results of the presidential election. It has
been argued that under the Electoral College the votes of citizens
voting in the minority of each state were "wasted" because they had
no effect upon the final election but instead were cast aside after the
first of two stages in which each state decided how its electoral votes
would be cast.4 3 Finally, the direct election would eliminate any possi-
bility of a "misfire" in which a candidate might be elected after re-
ceiving less than a majority of the popular vote.4
43. The State of Delaware, in asking the Supreme Court to strike down the use
of the unit-vote rule in the Electoral College, put it this way:
Votes cast for the losing candidate within a particular state are not only
discarded at an intermediate stage of the elective process but are effectively
treated as if they had been cast for an opponent. . . . The state unit system
causes [minority] votes to be spent and their own political effectiveness exhausted
at a preliminary stage of the election.
Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint and Brief at 7-8, 56, Delaware v. New
York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
See also note 2 supra.
44. The electoral college method of electing a President has governed forty-five
presidential elections and has produced fourteen Presidents who did not obtain
a majority of the popular votes cast in the election. They are: John Quincy
Adams in 1824 (with 30.54 percent of the popular vote) ; James K. Polk in 1844
(49.56 percent) ; Zachary Taylor in 1848 (47.35 percent) James C. Buchanan in
1856 (45.63 percent) ; Abraham Lincoln in 1860 (39.79 percent) ; Rutherford B.
Hayes in 1876 (48.04 percent); James A. Garfield in 1880 (48.32 percent);
Grover Cleveland in 1884 (48.53 percent); Benjamin Harrison in 1888 (47.86
percent) ; Grover Cleveland in 1892 (46.04 percent) ; Woodrow Wilson in 1912
(41.85 percent) ; Woodrow Wilson in 1916 (49.26 percent); Harry S. Truman
in 1948 (49.51 percent) ; and John F. Kennedy in 1960 (49.71 percent).
Of the fourteen minority Presidents, three of them each received fewer popular
votes than his major opponent.
In 1824: Andrew Jackson received 43.13 percent of the popular vote and
37.93 percent of the electoral vote; John Q. Adams, 30.54 percent of the popular
[VOL. 13 : p. 303
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V. EFFECTS OF VOTING POWER INEQUALITIES
It has been shown that under the present Electoral College, as well
as with the proportional and district plans, voters residing in different
states have an unequal ability to affect the election of the President.
Although this is something that can be demonstrated with mathematical
precision, like other forms of political or social power it cannot be
conclusively confirmed by empirical evidence. The New York Court of
Appeals put it this way: "Nor will practical experience in the use of
such plans furnish relevant data since the sole criterion is the mathe-
matical voting power which each legislator possesses in theory - i.e.,
the indicia of representation - and not the actual voting power he
possesses in fact - i.e., the indicia of influence."45 Although one can-
not empirically measure voting power, one may be able to observe some
of the effects of its inequitable distribution, and thereby obtain some
confirmation that the mathematical quantity he had determined with
such precision is closely related to social and political phenomena which
the processes of law can appreciate and with which they can deal.
Under the present system a New Yorker's vote has more than
twice the chance of affecting the election of the President as the vote
of a resident of Nebraska. Both mathematical analysis and common
sense would indicate that an informed candidate would be willing to
expend more than twice the resources per voter on a New Yorker as
he would on a Nebraskan. In particular, one would expect higher per
and 32.18 percent of the electoral; Henry Clay, 13.24 percent of the popular and
14.18 percent of the electoral; and William H. Crawford, 13.09 percent of the
popular and 15.71 percent of the electoral. Because no candidate received a
majority of the electoral vote, the selection of President devolved on the House
of Representatives. Adams was selected President, receiving the votes of thirteen
states to seven states for Jackson and four for Crawford. It is alleged that Adams
won the election because of Clay's support.
In 1876: Democratic presidential candidate Samuel J. Tilden won a majority
of the popular vote (50.99 percent). He had over 250,000 popular votes more than
the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes. Yet Tilden lost the election by
one electoral vote (185 to 184), after certain disputed electoral votes from four
states had been determined (two days before Inauguration Day) adversely to
him by an Electoral Commission created by Congress.
In 1888: Grover Cleveland received 48.66 percent of the popular vote and
42 percent of the electoral vote. On the other hand, Benjamin Harrison obtained
a popular vote of 47.86 percent and an electoral majority of 58 percent. Harrison
was elected President. Although Cleveland had about 100,000 popular votes more
than Harrison, Harrison won pivotal states by small margins. A switch of a few
thousand votes in New York would have swung the election to Cleveland.
COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE RErORM, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ELECTING THE
PRESIDENT 27-28 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
Charles W. Bischoff of the Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, has calculated that the chances of a misfire remain great even in
modern times and that in an election as close as that between Kennedy and Nixon,
there was almost a 50% chance of the winner receiving less than half the popular vote.
See N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT - THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE (to be published in spring, 1968).
45. lannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 252, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199,
282 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1967).
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capita expenditures of campaign finances as well as an inordinate
amount of the presidential candidate's time and other resources (e.g.,
attention by chief assistants and promises of potential patronage) to be
allocated to the larger states. Since this in fact appears to be the case,46
it provides a partial confirmation of the analysis. One would also
expect, for similar reasons, that this would be one important factor in
the decision of major parties to select candidates from the large states,
an effect which is well documented and which has long been recognized.
4 7
When third parties within states support one of the major party
candidates, they have power and importance to the extent that in a
reasonably close election their votes may be able to shift the outcome
one way or another. Since individual members of third parties in the
largest states have more than twice the voting power of members of
third parties in more than half of the other states, both mathematical
analysis and common sense also indicate that a third party in the
larger states has more political power per member than third parties in
most of the other states. To this extent, the inequitable distribution of
voting power under the Electoral College may enhance the power and
importance - and perhaps even the development - of third parties in
the larger states.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. It is possible to measure voting power by using a technique
which is generally accepted in the fields of mathematics and political
science and which is beginning to receive judicial approval. Under this
method a citizen's voting power is proportional to his ability to affect
the election by his vote.
2. The existing Electoral College system discriminates against
voters in the small and middle-sized states by giving citizens of the
46. See p. 306 supra.
47. For example, in the last 25 presidential elections a New Yorker has been a
candidate for 26 out of a possible 100 positions; an average of 1 New Yorker running
in every election. Of the 46 men elected to the Presidency, 11 have been New Yorkers.
COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ELECTING THE
PRESIDENT, apps. G & H (1967).
It is important to distinguish with respect to both the expenditure of resources
and the selection of candidates between gross and per capita effects. Even if there
were no voting inequalities, all other things being equal a candidate would probably
tend to spend more campaign money in large states than in small states simply because
there are more voters in each large state whom he may be able to persuade. However,
if a New Yorker's vote has twice the chance of determining the election of the
candidate as a Nebraskan's, a shrewd candidate will tend to spend more on each New
York voter than on each Nebraskan. The ratio of resources expended in New York
to resources expended in Nebraska will then tend to depend on the fact that New
York has more voters and on the fact that they are each more valuable in terms of
winning the election. Naturally the actual figures will also depend greatly on a large
number of external factors which may vary from election to election. A similar
double-barreled effect probably accounts in part for the very large number of New
York candidates.
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large states an excessive amount of voting power. Citizens of states
like New York and California have over two and one-half times as
much chance to affect the election of the President as residents of some
of the smaller states and over three times as much chance as citizens
of the District of Columbia. Disparities in voting power of over 200%
have been demonstrated and disparities of over 100% are not uncom-
mon. Citizens of 32 states and the District of Columbia have less
than average voting power.
3. Proportional plans under which the electoral votes of each
state would be divided in proportion to the candidates' state-wide vote
discriminate against residents of the large and middle-sized states by
giving citizens in the small states a greatly excessive voting power.
Under such proposed plans, citizens of states like Nevada and Alaska
would have more than four times as much chance to affect the election
of the President as residents of New York or California. A disparity
of over 400% has been demonstrated. Moreover, under such plans,
171,049,740 citizens of 36 states and the District of Columbia - over
95% of the total population - would have less than average voting
power.
4. District plans, under which the citizens of each state would
elect two electors at large and one from each congressional district, also
discriminate against the large and middle-sized states by placing exces-
sive voting power in the hands of citizens of the small states. Even
under an ideal system in which congressional districts within each
state would be equal in population, citizens of less populous states
would have over two and one-half times the voting power of residents
of some of the larger states. Disparities of over 100% are common.
168,104,360 citizens of 34 states - again over 90% of the total popula-
tion - would have less than average voting power. Moreover, because
the election would be based upon congressional districts which may not
be uniform in population, citizens of the same state may not have the
same voting power and, as a result, the disparities already demon-
strated would be increased. Gerrymandering, which would be possible
under this plan, is beyond the scope of this analysis.
5. In a direct presidential election all citizens would have equal
voting power and an equal chance to affect the outcome of the election.
No other existing or proposed plan can even approximate such equality.
6. As many people have long suspected, the inequalities in voting
power under the present Electoral College may be reflected in such
WINTER 1968]
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practical matters as the allocation of campaign finances and other re-
sources, the selection of candidates, and the effectiveness of third parties.
The analysis presented herein reveals, apparently for the first
time,48 the type and magnitude of the inequalities in our present system
for electing the President. In so doing it will probably surprise those
who have always assumed that the present Electoral College system
favored the rural citizens from the less populous states because they
have a larger number of electoral votes per capita. It also offers quanti-
tative support for serious students of the system who suspected, but
could not prove, how the system worked. For example, the American
Bar Association has stated that: "[I]t is claimed that the system gives
too much weight to some voters and too little to others ...gives ex-
cessive power to organized groups in states where the parties are evenly
matched ... limits campaigns to pivitol states and nominations for the
Presidency to persons from large states. '49  The New York Bar As-
sociation was of the opinion that:
[T]he present system, among other defects, distorts the entire
process because of the undue attention that is given "swing" voters
in states with a large number of electors in which the parties are
evenly matched.... While the ratio of electoral votes to population
is such that it would seem that the system favors residents of
Alaska, Nevada, Wyoming, and other sparsely populated states
the most and New York, Pennsylvania, California and other
heavily populated states the least, the practice of giving all of a
48. As previously indicated, see note 14 supra, earlier mathematical studies of
the Electoral College focused on a different problem. They concerned themselves
with the problem of how often the bloc of electoral votes cast by any given state
could be decisive or critical in determining the outcome of the presidential election.
They found that the voting power (or power index) of each state, considered as an
entity, is almost proportional to the number of electoral votes it can cast, with a slight"systematic bias giving an advantage to the larger states." I. MANN & L. SHAPLY,
VALU14S op LARG5 GAMES, VI: EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE EXACTLY 8-9
(RAND Corp. Memo. RM-3158--PR 1962). These researchers did not concern them-
selves at that time with the more difficult problem of the voting power of the individual
citizen-voters residing in the different states, although they did speculate about the
results of such a study.
It is to be wondered what is the case in the multimillion-person game [problems
of this nature are called games], when the voters, rather than the states, are
considered the individual players. There is some intuitive evidence that the power
indices would again be in favor of the voter in the large states, and that this
bias quantitatively might be as much as double the one seen by treating the states
as the players [the voting units of the game].
Id. at 9.
In preparing this study the author has consulted with these two earlier re-
searchers, each of whom was kind enough to publicly express their support for his very
similar analysis of voting power under a multi-member district system. See note 8
supra. It should be carefully noted that the author's analysis and the earlier studies are
in no way in conflict. This study has used the earlier findings as a basis for determining
the voting power of the individual citizens based in part upon the power index of
their state. See note 28 supra.
49. Commission on Electoral College Reform, American Bar Ass'n, Electing the
President, 53 A.B.A.J. 219, 220 (1967).
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state's electoral votes to the winner of its popular vote, by however
small a plurality, has in fact contributed to the parties' selecting
their candidates and directing their campaigns with a view toward
affecting the outcome in the large industrial states."°
The analysis would also seem to support Professor Alexander M. Bickel
of Yale Law School who originally thought that no such proof could be
possible:
I think it reasonably clear that the effect of the electoral college
system over recent generations has been that it wastes many popu-
lar votes in relatively homogeneous states, and causes Presidential
elections to be decided for the most part in the large, populous,
heterogeneous states, where in turn block voting, as by minorities
or other interest groups, is often decisive. No one, I concede, can
offer mathematical proof that this is how the system has worked
and will continue to work, but that is not very important. Pre-
cisely, perhaps, because there is no mathematical proof, this -
what I have described - is the common perception of the system.
Whether or not it may be in some part myth, it governs political
behavior. The result has been that modern Presidents have been
particularly sensitive and responsive to urban and minority in-
terest .... 51
After extensive hearings on Electoral College reform before the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, a study of the
evidence prepared by the staff concluded:
A further charge against the unit-rule system is that it
strongly tends to overemphasize the political importance of the
large populous states. This has meant that presidential candidates
have come almost exclusively from such States. Except for Mr.
Landon of Kansas in 1936 and the incumbent President Truman
of Missouri in 1948, both major parties have limited their presi-
dential nominations in the last half century to men from the eight
largest States. Able men from small States are given little chance
to secure nominations from either major party, and are generally
not even regarded as "presidential timber." Both major parties
are accused of greater concern with the capacity of their candidate
to carry certain pivotal States than to command the support of
voters throughout the Nation as a whole.
The pivotal State also tends to monopolize the attention of
the candidates and their campaign efforts with the result that presi-
dential campaigns are not carried to the Nation as a whole. States
which are not regarded as doubtful, or which are considered of less
50. CoMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, BAR Ass'N OP THE CITY or Ntw YORK,
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROVIDING FOR DIRcT ELEcTION or PRESIDENT
AND VICE PRESIDENT 4 (1967).
51. Statement of Professor Bickel, in Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 1967).
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importance, are relatively ignored. Citizens in the smaller States
are less apt to see or hear the candidates in person and may be in-
clined to think that their interests are of less importance to the
candidates. For the same reason, it is charged that issues, party
platforms, and campaign promises are formulated with a view to
these pivotal States ...
In other words, despite the imbalance in the electoral college
favoring small States, the large urban States have come into
dominance because of the operation of the unit rule. Most de-
fenders of the present system do not dispute this point.52
Even a mathematical demonstration of gross inequalities in voting
power under the existing system may not be a sufficient reason to war-
rant a change. Arguably one may also wish to consider the other inter-
actions between the citizen and his Federal Government, including the
Senate which clearly favors the smaller states. Some consideration
should also be given to the political aspects of the present system and
the effects of a change upon the balance of power among different
interest groups. Nevertheless, in a country dedicated to the concepts
of democracy and equality for all men, it is only appropriate that a
very high priority be placed on assuring every citizen an equal oppor-
tunity to participate in the election of a man who will serve as our
highest national officer and as a symbol and spokesman equally for all
Americans. The effects the existing and proposed systems for electing
the President have on the voting rights of all Americans must be very
carefully considered by Congress, by the members of the state legisla-
tures, and by the people, who must eventually approve, and ultimately
live with, any constitutional provision."3
52. STAF OF T11E SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, OPERATION AND EFFECT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (Comm. Print
1961).
53. The author is indebted to Professor Martin A. Jacobs, Department of Mathe-
matics, Fairleigh Dickinson University, who under the author's direction made the
computer calculations upon which the article is based. The author also wishes to thank
Professor Irwin Mann, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York
University, and Lloyd S. Shapley of the RAND Corp. for their cooperation and
suggestions, and the Mathematics Department of Fairleigh Dickinson University,
Professor Mabel Dukeshire, Chairman, for providing the data processing facilities
and the assistance of Miss Carole Bertelsen and Mr. Ronald Wolfson.
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State Popula- Electoral Relative Excess tion From
Ngame tilon 1960 Vote Voting Voting Average Vot-
(1) Census 1964 Power (2) Power (3) ing Power (4)
Alabama -----..--..... 3266740. 10 1.632 63.2 -3.0
Alaska ..............._ 226167. 3 1.838 83.8 9.2
Arizona -------------- 1302161. 5 1.281 28.1 -23.9
Arkansas -------- 1786272. 6 1.315 31.5 -21.9
California ... . 15717204. 40 3.162 216.2 87.9
Colorado -------------- 1753947. 6 1.327 32.7 -21.1
Connecticut ..- -.... 2535234. 8 1.477 47.7 -12.2
Delaware 44.. 6292. 3 1.308 30.8 -22.3
Dist. of Columbia 763956. 3 1.000 .0 -40.6
Florida ------- .. 4951560. 14 1.870 87.0 11.1
Georgia . 3943116. 12 1.789 78.9 6.3
Hawaii .---- 632772. 4 1.468 46.8 -12.8
Idaho -------.----- 667191. 4 1.429 42.9 -15.1
Illinois ------------------ 10081158. 26 2.491 149.1 48.0
Indiana . 4662498. 13 1.786 78.6 6.1
Iowa ..................... 2757537. 9 1.596 59.6 -5.2
Kansas - .------- 2178611. 7 1.392 39.2 -17.3
Kentucky .... 3038156. 9 1.521 52.1 -9.6
Louisiana -------------- 3257022. 10 1.635 63.5 -2.9
Maine ..... 969265. 4 1.186 18.6 -29.5
Maryland ----- 3100689. 10 1.675 67.5 -.4
Massachusetts ---- 5148578. 14 1.834 83.4 9.0
Michigan ... 7823194. 21 2.262 126.2 34.4
Minnesota -- --..... 3413864. 10 1.597 59.7 -5.1
Mississippi .... 2178141. 7 1.392 39.2 -17.3
Missouri - ......... 4319813. 12 1.710 71.0 1.6
Montana ............ 674767. 4 1.421 42.1 -15.5
Nebraska -----.. 1411330. 5 1.231 23.1 -26.9
Nevada ------------- 285278. 3 1.636 63.6 -2.8
New Hampshire-- 606921. 4 1.499 49.9 -10.9
New Jersey-.------ 6066782. 17 2.063 106.3 22.6
New Mexico 951023. 4 1.197 19.7 -28.9
New York ---- 16782304. 43 3.312 231.2 96.8
North Carolina---- 4556155. 13 1.807 80.7 7.4
North Dakota--- 632446. 4 1.468 46.8 -12.8
Ohio . . . 9706397. 26 2.539 153.9 50.9
Oklahoma -----....... 2328284. 8 1.541 54.1 -8.4
Oregon . --- 1768687. 6 1.321 32.1 -21.5
Pennsylvania ------ 11319366. 29 2.638 163.8 56.8
Rhode Island ------ 859488. 4 1.259 25.9 -25.2
South Carolina.. 2382594. 8 1.524 52.4 -9.5
South Dakota-- 680514. 4 1.415 41.5 -15.9
Tennessee ---- 3567089. 11 1.721 72.1 2.3
Texas ------.. - 9579677. 25 2.452 145.2 45.7
Utah 890627. 4 1.237 23.7 -26.5
Vermont 389881. 3 1.400 40.0 -16.8
Virginia ..............- 3966949. 12 1.784 78.4 6.0
Washington .... 2853214. 9 1.569 56.9 -6.8
West Virginia----- 1860421. 7 1.506 50.6 -10.5
Wisconsin . 3951777. 12 1.788 78.8 6.2
Wyoming ...... 330066. 3 1.521 52.1 -9.6
(1) Includes the District of Columbia.
(2) Ratio of voting power of citizens of state compared with voters of the most deprived state.
(3) Percent by which voting power exceeds that of the most deprived voters (deviations).
(4) Percent by which voting power deviated from the average of the figures in column 4.
Minus signs in Tables I-III Indicate less than average voting power.
* STUDY PREPARED BY JOHN F. BANZHAF III, 100 PARK AVE., N.Y.C., BASED UPON WORK
REPORTED IN: 19 RUTGERS LAW REvIEw 317-4 (1965) & 75 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1309-38
(1966) // COMPUTER CALCULATIONS MADE UNDER DIRECTION OF AUTHOR BY PROF. MARTIN
A. JACOBS, DEPT. OF MATH., FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIV., TEANECK, N.J., ON UNIVERSITY'S
G.E.-235 TIME-SHARED COMPUTER SYSTEM. 26


















































































































(1) Includes the District of Columbia.
(2) Ratio of voting power of citizens of state compared with voters of the most deprived state.
(3) Percent by which voting power exceeds that of the most deprived voters (deviations).
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state Popula- Electoral Relative Excess tion From
Name tion 1960 Vote Voting Voting Average Vot-
(1) census 1964 Power (2) Power (3) ing Power (4)
Alabama 3266740. 10 1.302 30.2 -15.7
Alaska -------.....---- 226167. 3 3.075 207.5 99.1
Arizona ---------------- 1302161. 5 1.594 59.4 3.2
Arkansas -------------- 1786272. 6 1.459 45.9 -5.5
California ------------ 15717204. 40 1.004 .4 -35.0
Colorado -------------- 1753947. 6 1.472 47.2 -4.7
Connecticut - 2535234. 8 1.362 36.2 -11.8
Delaware -........... 446292. 3 2.189 118.9 41.7
Dist. of Columbia 763956. 3 1.673 67.3 8.3
Florida . . 4951560. 14 1.197 19.7 -22.5
Georgia --------------- 3943116. 12 1.267 26.7 -18.0
Hawaii ----------------- 632772. 4 2.092 109.2 35.5
Idaho .................- 667191  4 2.038 103.8 31.9
Illinois ------------------ 10081158. 26 1.059 5.9 -31.4
Indiana ------------.... 4662498. 13 1.200 20.0 -22.3
Iowa-------- 2757537. 9 1.364 36.4 -11.7
Kansas --------- -- 2178611. 7 1.399 39.9 -9.4
Kentucky - ---------- 3038156. 9 1.299 29.9 -15.9
Louisiana ----- .-.... 3257022. 10 1.304 30.4 -15.6
Maine -......------------- 969265. 4 1.691 69.1 9.4
Maryland 3100689. 10 1.337 33.7 -13.5
Massachusetts ---- 5148578. 14 1.174 17.4 -24.0
Michigan .............- 7823194. 21 1.108 10.8 -28.3
Minnesota - ------ 3413864. 10 1.274 27.4 -17.5
Mississippi 2178141. 7 1.399 39.9 -9.4
Missouri ----- -.-- 4319813. 12 1.211 21.1 -21.6
Montana ..... 674767. 4 2.026 102.6 31.2
Nebraska ---------- 1411330. 5 1.532 53.2 -.9
Nevada ----- 285278. 3 2.738 173.8 77.3
New Hampshire.. 606921. 4 2.137 113.7 38.3
New Jersey ---------- 6066782. 17 1.162 16.2 -24.7
New Mexico-- 951023. 4 1.707 70.7 10.5
New York---- 16782304. 43 1.000 .0 -35.3
North Carolina.. 4556155. 13 1.214 21.4 -21.4
North Dakota--- 632446. 4 2.093 109.3 35.5
Ohio .................- 9706397. 26 1.080 8.0 -30.1
Oklahoma ------ 2328284. 8 1.422 42.2 -8.0
Oregon . .. 1768687. 6 1.466 46.6 -5.1
Pennsylvania . 11319366. 29 1.043 4.3 -32.5
Rhode Island- 859488. 4 1.795 79.5 16.2
South Carolina- 2382594. 8 1.405 40.5 -9.0
South Dakota----- 680514. 4 2.018 101.8 30.6
Tennessee ---------- 3567089. 11 1.291 29.1 -16.5
Texas -..-------..... 9579677. 25 1.070 7.0 -30.7
Utah . .. 890627. 4 1.764 76.4 14.2
Vermont .... 389881. 3 2.342 134.2 51.6
Virginia .- -......... 3966949. 12 1.264 26.4 -18.2
Washington 2853214. 9 1.341 34.1 -13.2
West Virginia---- 1860421. 7 1.514 51.4 -2.0
Wisconsin --- 3951777. 12 1.266 26.6 -18.0
Wyoming ---------- 330066. 3 2.546 154.6 64.8
(1) Includes the District of Columbia.
(2) Ratio of voting power of citizens of state compared with voters of the most deprived state.
(3) Percent by which voting power exceeds that of the most deprived voters (deviations).
(4) Percent by which voting power deviated from the average of the figures in column 4. 28
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State Popula- Electoral Relative Excess tion From
Name tion 1960 Vote Voting Voting Average Vot-
(1) Censu8 1964 Power (2) Power (8) ing Power (4)
Alabama --------...... 3266740. 10 1.000 0.0 0.0
Alaska ----..--------.... 226167. 3 1.000 0.0 0.0
Arizona ------------ 1302161. 5 1.000 0.0 0.0
Arkansas 1786272. 6 1.000 0.0 0.0
California ------------ 15717204, 40 1.000 0.0 0.0
Colorado ............._ 1753947. 6 1.000 0.0 0.0
Connecticut ------ 2535234. 8 1.000 0.0 0.0Delaware .............- 446292. 3 1.000 0.0 0.0
Dist. of Columbia 763956. 3 1.000 0.0 0.0
Florida ................ 4951560. 14 1.000 0.0 0.0
Georgia ------------- 3943116. 12 1.000 0.0 0.0
Hawaii ............. 632772. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
Idaho -------------------- 667191. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
Illinois ................. 10081158. 26 1.000 0.0 0.0
Indiana .............. 4662498. 13 1.000 0.0 0.0
Iowa .-. ......... 2757537. 9 1.000 0.0 0.0
Kansas.......... 2178611. 7 1.000 0.0 0.0
Kentucky -------------- 3038156. 9 1,000 0.0 0.0
Louisiana ......... 3257022. 10 1,000 0.0 0.0
Maine ..... 969265. 4 1,000 0.0 0.0Maryland -----....... 3100689. 10 1.000 0.0 0.0
Massachusetts ._ 5148578. 14 1,000 0.0 0.0
Michigan ......... 7823194. 21 1.000 0.0 0.0
Minnesota ....... 3413864. 10 1.000 0.0 0.0
Mississippi ---....... 2178141. 7 1.000 0.0 0.0
Missouri. - 4319813. 12 1.000 0.0 0.0
Montana 674767. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
Nebraska ....-- 1411330. 5 1.000 0.0 0.0
Nevada -........ 285278. 3 1.000 0.0 0.0
New Hampshire 606921. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
New Jersey.... 6066782. 17 1.000 0.0 0.0
New Mexico ...... 951023. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
New York ......... 16782304. 43 1.000 0.0 0.0
North Carolina. 4556155. 13 1.000 0.0 0.0
North Dakota.... 632446. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
Ohio ................... 9706397. 26 1.000 0.0 0.0
Oklahoma .....-- 2328284. 8 1.000 0.0 0.0
Oregon ............ 1768687. 6 1.000 0.0 0.0
Pennsylvania .... 11319366. 29 1.000 0.0 0.0
Rhode Island .... 859488. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
South Carolina.... 2382594. 8 1.000 0,0 0.0South Dakota.... 680514. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
Tennessee ..... 3567089. 11 1.000 0.0 0.0
Texas .................. 9579677. 25 1.000 0.0 0.0
Utah ....... .... 890627. 4 1.000 0.0 0.0
Vermont .......... 389881. 3 1.000 0.0 0.0
Virginia ............ 3966949. 12 1.000 0.0 0.0
Washington ...... 2853214. 9 1.000 0.0 0.0
West Virginia.... 1860421. 7 1.000 0.0 0.0
Wisconsin .... 3951777. 12 1.000 0.0 0.0
Wyoming ........ 330066. 3 1.000 0.0 0.0
(1) Includes the District of Columbia.
(2) Ratio of voting power of citizens of state compared with voters of the most deprived state.
(3) Percent by which voting Power exceeds that of the most deprived voters (deviations).
(4) Percent by which voting power deviated from the average of the figures in column 4. 29
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